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THE LAW OF TORTS.

Reviewed by Michael L. Richmond****
INTRODUCTION

Critics acclaimed the first edition of Harper and James' torts
treatise as making an important contribution to the development of
the law. Not content to summarize the law as it existed,1 the authors challenged their readers to explore beyond the narrow boundaries of the then current law of torts. Those consulting its three
volumes found a master plan for a new way of looking at how society should compensate those who suffered harm from the intentional or careless acts of others. The authors rejected traditional
formulas of fault and intent in favor of a system of "social insurance," which allocated the burden of paying for loss among the widest possible segment of society. Although this bold hypothesis did
not meet with immediate acceptance, critics unanimously welcomed
the challenge it presented to the traditional theory of torts.
The new edition of the treatise, updated and substantially enlarged by Professor Oscar Gray, likewise deserves recognition as an
important work. The reasons, however, are not the same. The first
edition promoted a new way of thinking about torts and spawned a
generation of commentary and analysis. In contrast, the second
edition is content to restate many of its predecessor's conclusions
and fails to carry forward the inquisitive spirit of the first edition.
The great value of the second edition lies in its review and synLate Simeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law, Yale University.
Late Sterling Professor Emeritus of Law, Yale University.
*** Professor of Law, University of Maryland.
Associate Professor of Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law. A.B.,
*
Hamilton College (1967); J.D., Duke University (1971); M.S.L.S., University of North Carolina (1974).
The author wishes to thank Dean Roger I. Abrams and Professor Paul Joseph of Nova
University Center for the Study of Law for their kind attention to the manuscript.
1. With a massive revision of the Restatement of Torts under way at the time of publication of the first edition, little need existed for a duplication of efforts.
*
**
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thesis of contemporary developments in tort law. The massive
changes in the law of torts have required a complete rewriting of
several sections of the treatise and the addition of a substantial
amount of new material.
Professor Gray has taken the opportunity to order the current
disarray in the law of torts. Where the first edition challenged, the
second clarifies; where the first cast doubt, the second defines. This
Book Review first will consider the new edition's drawbacks and
then will consider why it deserves recognition independent of its
predecessor.
I.
The primary weakness of the second edition lies in the fact that
Professor Gray does not view it as a new edition, but as a revision of
the first.2 Unfortunately, too many of the faults of the first edition
reoccur. It might be considered mere academic carping to dwell on
unimproved areas, yet taken as a whole they reveal an unwillingness
to root out or at least to question errors in the prior work-a problem which Professor Gray easily could have rectified and which detracts from his fine individual effort.
For instance, several reviewers criticized the treatment of intentional torts in the first edition.3 One would have hoped that the new
edition would have questioned the basic material, looking for new
applications and attempting to eliminate erroneous and misleading
matter. Yet though some of the discussion needs closer editing,
even these sections demonstrate thorough scholarship and careful

thought.
Although the author effectively deals with many contemporary
cases regarding consent to battery,4 he fails to take advantage of an
excellent opportunity to expand this discussion to other contexts.
2. Gray's preface continually refers to the new edition as a "revision." F.V. HARPER,
F. JAMES, JR. & O.S. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter Second Edition].
3. "There is room for concern, however, as to whether some of the older torts do not
deserve new analysis and original treatment in the light of current developments in our society just as badly as the law of accidents needs it." Leflar, Book Review, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1156, 1157 (1957). See also Malone, Book Review, 17 LA. L. REv. 877 (1957); Seavey, Book
Review, 66 YALE L.J. 955 (1957).
4. For example, the author carefully weaves recent cases involving consent with older
cases to show how the fabric of the law continues to build on its earlier foundation. Second
Edition, supra note 2, § 3.10 nn.28-29 and accompanying text. Of particular interest is the
juxtaposition of the early cases dealing with consent of minors to sexual intercourse with the
more recent cases permitting minors to consent to abortions without consulting their parents.
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His cursory treatment of recent sports cases is disappointing,5 particularly in light of some fine research which has appeared recently.6 Similarly, he relegates cases evidencing novel uses of
traditional battery theories to the footnotes. The use of a cause of
action in battery against a manufacturer of drugs7 or a health care
supplier undertaking normal treatment 8 deserves textual treatment
and analysis. For the most part, however, Professor Gray has done
an excellent job of updating the material in the first edition. The
occasional inadequacies are the exception rather than the rule.
Of greater concern is the treatment of false imprisonment,
where Professor Gray permits one of the grand "legal chestnuts" to
stand unchallenged. In the first edition, the authors challenged the
Restatement of Torts and proclaimed, "it must affirmatively appear
that the detention or confinement is contrary to the other's will or
there is no action." 9 In other words, a court would have to dismiss
a complaint in which the plaintiff failed to allege that the confinement was without his consent.10
In support of this statement, both the first and second editions
refer the reader to Herring v. Boyle," a British case in which a
mother arrived at a boarding school to take her son home for the
holidays. The schoolmaster refused to let the child leave, claiming
that the mother had an outstanding balance in her account. During
the entire incident, the child had no idea that his mother had come
for him. The later action for false imprisonment on behalf of the
child was dismissed. On its face, Herring might appear to support
the treatise's proposition; the child could not have expressed lack of
consent when he did not know of the confinement. Accordingly,
the complaint could not have alleged that the child did not consent.
To the contrary, the Herring case demonstrates that the plaintiff
must be aware of the confinement, not that the plaintiff must plead
5. See Second Edition, supra note 2, § 3.10 nn.7-10 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., DiNicola & Mendeloff, Controlling Violence in ProfessionalSports: Rule
Reform and the Federal Professional Sports Violence Commission, 21 DUQ. L. REV. 843
(1983); Horrow, Violence in ProfessionalSports: Is It Partof the Game?, 9 J. LEGIS. 1 (1982);
Comment, Torts in Sports-'"I'll See You in Court!", 16 AKRON L. REv. 537 (1983).
7. See Second Edition, supra note 2, § 3.2 n.2.
8. See Second Edition, supra note 2, § 3.2 n.3.
9.

F.V. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 3.6 (1956) [hereinafter First

Edition].
10. The Second Restatement of Torts rejects placing the burden of pleading and proving
consent on the plaintiff, preferring instead to have the plaintiff demonstrate merely that he
was "conscious of the confinement or [was] harmed by it." RitS-'A'rI'MENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 35 (1965).
11. 149 Eng. Rep. 1126 (Ex. Ch. 1834).
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and prove what courts traditionally have considered an affirmative
defense.12 Baron Alderson's opinion, cited by the text as authority,
confirms this reading.1 3 The reason the plaintiff merely need prove
consciousness of confinement rather than a lack of consent is
brought out by the very nature of the tort. False imprisonment
protects against the imposition of a mental disturbance rather than
against a simple dignitary affront. t4 In all fairness, Professor
Gray's argument does not take as strong a stance as that advocated
by the first edition. At one point he even seems to treat consent as a

defense when he notes: "If the plaintiff voluntarily submits there is
no confinement." 15 Yet since Gray has given the subject considerable thought, as demonstrated by extensive amendments to both the
footnotes and text, he should have taken a bolder position and corrected the earlier text.
The same deference to the prior edition which suffuses the treat-

ment of intentional torts is also found in the discussion of liability
for negligence, the area where Harper and James most acutely
demonstrated their creative genius. At the time of the first edition,
critics praised the authors for their realistic perspective on the uses
and function of the law of torts in rectifying the problems caused by
accidents. 6 Unquestionably, in the vast circus parade of plaintiffs'
"rights," Harper and James drove the immense steam calliope.
Their concept of "social insurance" presented a new and seductive
method of looking at the function of the law, one which stimulated
12. See Second Edition, supra note 2, § 3.10 nn.l-3 and accompanying text.
13. "There was a total absence of any proof of consciousness of restraint on the part of
the plaintiff. No act of restraint was committed in his presence; and I am of the opinion that
the refusal in his absence to deliver him up to his mother was not a false imprisonment."
Herring, 149 Eng. Rep. at 1127-28 (opinion of Alderson, B.).
14. Where... no harm results from a confinement and the plaintiff is not even
subjected to the mental disturbance of being made aware of it at the time, his mere
dignitary interest in being free from an interference with his personal liberty which
he has only discovered later is not of suflicient importance to justify the recovery of
the nominal damages involved.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 42 comment a (1965). Section 35 comment h further
notes that the tort stems "from the realization that one's will to choose one's location is
subordinated to the will of another ....
" It is the subordination itself rather than the unwillingness to succumb to another's wishes which gives rise to the plaintiff's recovery.
15. Second Edition, supra note 2, § 3.8 n.9 and accompanying text. The cases listed in
the footnote are of modem origin, evidently the product of Professor Gray's own research
rather than that of the authors of the first edition.
16. "[T]his is not meant to be just a plaintiff's brief. If today's facts and judicial decisions happen to favor plaintiffs as a class, everyone should know about it and talk about it,
not under the guise of 'duty' and 'proximate cause,' but in the pure light of today's conditions." Probert, Book Review, 8 W.mT. Ras. L. REV. 546, 547 (1957).
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praise from proponents17 and deep respect from critics.18 With wit
and panache1 9 the authors pairlstakingly described the problems
caused by accidents, 0 the means the law had adopted to solve the
problems,2" and the problems the solutions themselves then created."2 They then took the extra step so rarely taken and proposed
a new solution, 23 one which they argued would remedy existing inequities without creating new ones.
The debate which they occasioned carries forward to the present
day. Even since the new edition went to page proofs, articles have
continued to emerge probing, approving, explaining, and questioning the concepts originally put forth by Harper and James. 24 One
suspects that this point-counterpoint-a pure churning of the intellectual waters-would have delighted the authors.
[James] would ask, in his teaching and in his writing, questions
he was not prepared to answer.... He could not say; he did not
know; yet the questions were consistently and courageously
asked.... I use his casebook still because it continues to urge me
to "carry the quest further"

.

.

.

and to show me how much re-

17. "Whatever the word 'classic' means, omitting the element of age, this book will fit
the definition." Leflar, supra note 3, at 1156. See also Davis, Book Review, 36 TEx. L. REV.
257 (1957); Gordon, Book Review, 31 CONN. B.J. 145 (1957).
18. "Whether the trend should be in this direction is one question. Whether the trend is
in this direction is an entirely different question. It is this reviewer's impression that the
authors are over-eager to find evidence of such a trend." Plant, Book Review, 42 MINN. L.
REV. 162, 165 (1957). The review earlier called the treatise "an outstanding contribution to
the literature of the torts field." Id. at 162. See also Keeton, Book Review, 45 CAL. L. Rv.
230, 233 (1957) (asserting that no argument could be made that such a trend was occurring);
Noel, Book Review, 25 TENN. L. REV. 321, 322-23 (1957) (criticizing the authors for unduly
minimizing the vital fault principle).
19. The style definitely is above the average in a law book, and it is pleasant to find
legal writers who can use effectively a bit of verse to illustrate the subject of forcible
entry... or a few striking lines from T. S.Eliot to bring out the slippery meaning of
some commonly accepted terms.
Noel, supra note 18, at 321.
20. First Edition, supra note 9, ch. 11.
21. Id., ch. 12.
22. Id., ch. 13.
23. Yet Jimmy [Fleming James, Jr.] was unusual among the legal realists for he
knew how to build as well as how to tear down. Much of tort law as he found it, as
it had traditionally been described, made no sense because it ignored the existence
of insurance. It was ripe for debunking. But Jimmy was not satisfied with pointing
out the sham that many of the traditional formulations were and how courts and
juries got around them. He had to develop new rules that would make sense, given
insurance, for now.
Calabresi, "You Can Call It Thucydides or You Can Call It Mustard Plaster, But It's All
Proximate Cause Just The Samel", 91 YALE L.J. 1 (1981).
24. For example, see the excellent article written by Professor David C. Sobelsohn challenging the rationale underlying comparative negligence. Sobelsohn, Comparing Fault, 60
IND. L.J. 413 (1985).
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mains obscure. Just as he remade torts law,
he showed us all
25
how much remains, always, to be remade.
Perhaps the new edition should not expand deeply on the theories advanced in the predecessor volume. Perhaps this duty does
not lie when one is updating a classic in its field. This may explain
why Gray did little beyond updating the seminal chapters of the
first edition. Nonetheless, given the sweeping changes in the law of
torts occasioned by the original work, and given the desire of its
authors for continual questioning and probing, 6 one would have

hoped for a revisitation of the chapters bearing on the concept of
social insurance. In discussing fault as a basis for liability, for example, Professor Gray might have considered the many outstanding
recent contributions of scholars reaching far beyond the simple concept of social insurance as developed in the first edition.2
The heart of the concept of social insurance is the need to compensate those injured in accidents.
[H]uman losses remain. It is the principal job of tort law today
to deal with these losses. They fall initially on people who as a
class can ill afford them, and this fact brings great hardship upon
the victims themselves and causes unfortunate repercussions to
society as a whole. The best and most efficient way to deal with
accident loss, therefore, is to assure accident victims of substantial compensation, and to distribute the losses involved over society as a whole or some very large segment of it. Such a basis for
administering losses is what we have called social insurance.2 8

While most contemporary authors accept this thesis, they do
not stop at merely reallocating the costs a jury will assess. Neither
Gray, nor Harper and James, considered the fact that personal in25. Calabresi, supra note 23, at 2.
26. Harper, like James, seemed to agree with the need to debate and expand old ideas.
James himself spoke of Harper's "lively and broad-gauged intellectual interests .... " James,
Fowler Vincent Harper, 74 YALE L.J. 604, 605 (1965).
27. Although other examples abound, this review will concentrate primarily on the recent work of Professor Jeffrey O'Connell. See, eg., Symposium: Alternative Compensation
Schemes and Tort Theory, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 548 (1985).
28. First Edition, supra note 9, § 13.2. This is repeated without significant change in the
Second Edition at the same section and notes. This book review assumes for the most part
that the concept of social insurance is both desirable and feasible. Time may prove neither of
these conclusions to be true. Serious questions exist over whether, in the face of seven-figure
verdicts, the insurance industry can adapt itself to meet the demands of recovery increased
both in amount and frequency. Without joining in the very real battle which rages in scholarly journals, legislative halls, and the media, this book review only recognizes that substantial doubt exists over whether the insurance industry can continue to survive in any
semblance of its present form. If it cannot, the question is entirely open as to what will
replace it. See Business Struggles to Adapt as Insurance CrisisSpreads, Wall St. J., Jan. 21,
1986, at 31.
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jury litigation involves elements of damages beyond compensating
injured parties for their economic losses. In many cases, much of
the plaintiff's award is in the form of intangible damages for pain
and suffering.29 One hardly can term these payments "compensatory" or view them as a part of the total loss occasioned to society
by an accident. They stem from the reaction of juries to the pain
suffered by a fellow human being, pain described by counsel skilled
in manipulating human heartstrings. Tort cases do occasion a net
loss to the economy of a society; Harper, James and Gray properly
identify the allocation of this loss as the principal issue of tort theory. The sad fact remains that damages awarded for intangible
harm simply add to the overall loss society must suffer.3 °
Backed by a battery of economic "expert witnesses, 3 1 counsel
for both plaintiffs and defendants often make assessing the unassessible the primary battleground of tort litigation. Litigants expend countless hours of court time and productivity to win the
hearts of a handful of men and women charged with determining
not how to protect an accident victim against a serious economic
29. Professor Gray's cavalier statement, echoing one in the first edition, that "[e]ven
where fault causes the injury ... damages are for the most part compensatory," needs far
more support than a vague reference to the Restatement and an isolated California case.
Second Edition, supra note 2, § 25.19. O'Connell, for example, argues strongly to the contrary and cites at least one study supporting his position. See generally O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants' Payment for Pain and Suffering in Return for Payment of
Claimants'Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L.F. 333, 334-40.
30. Societal assets include both tangible property and the combined ability of members
of society to contribute productively for the common good. When property is destroyed or
when a member cannot continue to contribute as in the past, society has suffered a loss. For
this reason, property damage and medical expenses fall into the same category of damages as
loss of earnings and permanent disabilities.
To the contrary, the pain an individual suffers from incurring an injury-whether mental
or physical-does not harm society as a whole except to the extent it renders the victim
unable to continue to produce at the rate he or she did in the past. Pain and suffering which
do not affect the contribution a victim would normally make to society are thus personal
issues and not truly compensable under the concept of social insurance. Indeed, any payments made to an individual for pain which does not decrease his or her social utility represent losses to society over and above those which can be assigned to the accident itself.
Social insurance protects society by placing economic losses where they will cause the
least disruption to the normal functioning of society. The reason for protecting the individual
least capable of bearing the loss is in large part the need for society to have its members at
their maximum level of productivity, not fighting to come back from devastating economic
hardship. See generally O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused: Foreclosure of Personal
Injury Claims by Defendant's Prompt Tender of Claimant's Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw.
U.L. REV. 589 (1982).
31. See generally Corboy, Economic Experts in Tort Litigation, 8 LITIGATION, Winter
1982, at 28; Johnson & Flanigan, Economic Valuation for Wrongful Death, 6 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 47 (1984); McLeod & Foster, FV=PV(I+i)n: Economic Evaluation of Damages in
PersonalInjury and Wrongful Death Litigation, 19 GA. ST. B.J. 60 (1982).
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setback, but rather how much to pay a victim over and above simple economic loss. Weeks turn into months and multiply into years
while litigants await the result of legal wrangling over an issue
which has no place in the calculus of social insurance. Accepting
the hypothesis that to best serve society we must spread the cost of
losses across the widest possible segment available, we still must
encounter the hard reality that many of the payments made even
under the theory of strict products liability (which in doctrine and
practice most closely approaches the realization of social insurance)
go to "compensate" for intangible harm. Today, the tort system
functions, therefore, to add to the overall loss suffered by society
32
rather than to minimize it.
We should seek to rapidly compensate victims of accidents in
order to facilitate their return to the work force, much as we have
done with workers' compensation statutes.3 3 The accident victim
has the greatest need for compensation when medical bills become
due, rather than many years later. Our present system encourages
defendants to delay settlement as long as possible, hoping that the
monetary bite on the plaintiff will force a lower settlement-one
which does little more than cover the doctor's bills after the plaintiff's attorney has accepted a percentage of the settlement as a fee.3 4
In contrast, the optimal system should compensate the compensable, including potential loss of earnings and diminution of working
power. Both of these represent losses to society of a contribution by
an otherwise productive member. Such a method would function
without imposing on an overburdened court system additional
transactional costs as higher legal fees, increased insurance premiums and undue court costs.
In a series of articles, Professor Jeffrey O'Connell has outlined a
32. Ironically, both editions note that the British prefer tort liability over social insurance for automobile accidents "because of [the] unwillingness to deprive injured people of the
chance of the much greater recovery at common law." Second Edition, supranote 2, § 25.20.
Great Britain does not permit full assessment of damages for pain and suffering. Abraham,
Book Review, 95 YALE L.J. 1043, 1058 (1986).
33. See generally A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 2.20
(1985).
34. Contingent fees have come under heavy criticism lately. Several states have begun
to limit their amount in light of perceived public pressure. For example, the Florida Supreme
Court recently adopted a schedule limiting the percentages and amounts of contingent fees.
The Florida Bar re Amendment to the Code of Professional Responsibility (Contingent Fees),
No. 68, 417, slip op. (June 30, 1986). A vice-president of G. D. Searle & Co., a company
presently involved in numerous lawsuits regarding its intrauterine device, commented that
thus far, "[t]he financial burden is not created by payments to the plaintiffs but by payments
to lawyers." Searle: Staringat Some Long Days in Court, Bus. Week, Feb. 17, 1986, at 35. A
discussion of the need to limit contingent fees is beyond the scope'of this book review.
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proposal for tort system reform in which he envisions a sequence of
trade-offs with plaintiffs and defendants each relinquishing economically wasteful advantages they presently enjoy in litigation.35 He
proposes that the defendant forego the defense of comparative or
contributory fault in exchange for the plaintiff's agreement not to
invoke the collateral source rule.3 6 Further, the defendant would
pay the plaintiff's attorney's fees as a direct element of damages but
would not have to pay damages for pain and suffering. 37 The defendant would settle the claim promptly by reimbursing the plaintiff
for all economic harm suffered, and in return the plaintiff would
relinquish procedural advantages. 38 Most recently, Professor
O'Connell has advocated preventive measures in the form of contracts between parties relating to potential damages where tort lia39
bility resulting from the relationship is a distinct possibility.
This issue does not revolve around the propriety of the plan envisioned by Professor O'Connell. Indeed, some of his procedural
methods seem a bit heavy-handed, although in the main his proposal has the solid ring of common sense. There is serious and complex thinking taking place around the country, resulting in
sophisticated and sensible alternatives not only to traditional fault
liability but also to the system of "social insurance" envisioned
thirty-two years ago by Harper and James. As a result, the brave
initiatives of the first edition appear simplistic in light of the flurry
of such recent, more extensive proposals. Given the degree of sophistication shown by Professor O'Connell and others, combined
with the trailblazing nature of the first edition, one would have
looked for Professor Gray to grasp the opportunity to build upon
the earlier thought and to bring it into the context of the modern
proposals. By clinging too closely to the groundwork laid by
Harper and James, Gray bypasses an opportunity which the spirit
of the first edition demanded he seize.
35. For the first in this series of articles, see O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning
Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurancefor Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV.
501 (1976), expanded in J. O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS

WIN (1979).
36. See O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Contributory and ComparativeFault, With
CompensatorySavings by Also Abolishing the CollateralSource Rule, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 591.
37. See O'Connell, supra note 29.
38. See O'Connell, supra note 30. For an expansion by O'Connell of his discussion of
medical malpractice claims, see Moore & O'Connell, ForeclosingMedical Malpractice Claims
by Prompt Tender of Economic Loss, 44 LA. L. REv. 1267 (1984).
39. O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident Guaranteesof
Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 898 (1985).
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II.
The weaknesses in the second edition are those of omission
rather than commission. Deferring to the prior authors as greatly
as Gray did created problems, but such deference also lent a certain
strength to the work. Purchasers of the second edition will still benefit from the text of the first, to which Gray frequently refers. Further, the consistency of format from the first to second editions (a
consistency deliberately adopted by Gray) is sensible in that it enables those familiar with the first to locate the new research embodied in the second and also allows those using the second to refer
back to the first.
The strongest segments of the second edition are those areas
which Professor Gray wrote himself. They do not strike us with the
challenge of the first edition, but they serve an equally valid purpose. Gray clarifies the most muddied legal waters, making order
and sense out of what may seem a hopelessly jumbled array of theories and cases. Although this is evident in the material on products
liability,' ° it appears most clearly in the area of defamation. 1
The opening section of the chapter on defamation provides an
excellent exposition on the development and state of the law. Gray
provides clear and precise descriptions of key cases, gives new insight into underlying reasons for the law, analyzes the competing
theories in problem areas, and predicts future trends while suggesting new paths to pursue. Of particular note, Gray's lucid discussion of New York Times v. Sullivan4 2 not only describes the
opinion itself but also sets the case in proper historic context. He
shows how the landmark to all contemporary media libel decisions
grew not merely as a creature of the law, but as a response to external social pressures as well. 3 Gray's talent to clarify and order
reveals itself in his discussion of the diverse and inconsistent cases
which attempt to distinguish between fact and opinion,' and in the
exceptional way he rejects the need to draw the "per se" and "per
quod" distinction.4
40. Second Edition, supra note 2, ch. 28.
41. The first edition's material on defamation elicited criticism from several sources. See
Heuston, Book Review, 9 STAN. L. REv. 840, 842 (1957); Malone, supra note 3, at 879. This
earlier criticism, combined with massive changes in the law since the first edition, makes the
defamation chapter a particularly good testing point.
42. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
43. Second Edition, supra note 2, § 5.0 nn.13-15 and accompanying text.
44. Id. § 5.8.
45. Id. § 5.9A.
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Gray's treatment of the recent Supreme Court decision in Dun
& Bradstreetv. GreenmossBuilders, Inc.46 goes beyond simple exposition and considers the precedential impact of this complex decision. He alerts us to three likely effects of Greenmoss: (1) states
will avoid imposing strict liability where private plaintiffs have been
defamed, (2) the Court will extend the provisions of its earlier opinion in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.47 to protect nonmedia defendants
commenting on matters of public concern,4 8 and (3) media defendants who have made comments on matters not of public concern
may be entitled to Gertz protection. 9 To the practitioner or scholar
working in the area, these comments are most welcome, as is the
considered and lucid treatment of the puzzling Greenmoss case
itself.
Perhaps the chapter's most outstanding (albeit ill-fated) section
is that which deals with truth. 0 The role of truth in the delicate
ebb and flow of the defamation trial has always been perplexing.
Many courts paradoxically require the plaintiff to bear the burden
of pleading the negative by alleging falsity in the complaint, while
immediately shifting the burden of proving truth to the defendant
through the artifice of presumptions. As with his treatment of New
York Times v. Sullivan, Gray understands that the road to comprehension of a confusing doctrine lies through a keen awareness of the
past. Accordingly, he introduces the area with a complete discussion of how civil libel sprang from the now-defunct root of criminal
libel." He then asserts that the law prefers that truth remain for
the defendant to prove. His prophecy that despite some readings of
New York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny, the Supreme Court
will ultimately rely on this strong policy to prevent falsity from
working its way into the plaintiff's case,52 has regrettably proven
46. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
47. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
48. Most recently, the Supreme Court indicated its willingness to address this issue at a
future point. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986). See infra note
53 and accompanying text.
49. Second Edition, supranote 2, § 5.0 nn.54-60 and accompanying text. As to the third
point, one wonders how the media can claim that any event on which it may choose to
comment is not a matter of public interest. In an analogous situation, the Second Circuit held
that disclosure of information about the present status of a person who had been a child
prodigy 27 years prior to publication was a matter of sufficient public interest to avoid a
lawsuit based on a violation of the individual's right to privacy. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co.,
113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940). Justices continue to draw the public-private distinction in media
cases, however. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1566 (Brennan, J., concurring).
50. Second Edition, supra note 2, § 5.20.
51. Id. § 5.20 nn.2-19 and accompanying text.
52. Id. nn.50-51 and accompanying text.

19861

BOOK REVIEW

false. Almost simultaneously with the publication of the treatise,
the Supreme Court decided Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps.5 3 A private figure plaintiff suing a media defendant now
bears the burden of pleading and proving falsity.
The insight and depth of argument which Professor Gray brings
to this discussion is typical of the original work he has added to this
set of volumes. Combined with his organizational talents and thorough research in updating the sections of the first edition, 4 this will
prove to be Gray's greatest contribution and will cause this treatise
to retain its influence and authority within the profession.
III.
"One cannot hope by a quick reading of a text of this magnitude
to do much more than arrive at a general feeling about it."' 55 With
these words, Dean Page Keeton approached his review of the first
edition. The task of the reviewer today looms much larger, for now
there are six volumes rather than three. Another ironic twist is the
price. In reviewing the first edition, Professor Wex Malone commented: "This set of books is expensive .... If I had to decide
whether to part with my $60.00 or to do without Harper and James'
treatment of accident liability, I am sure I would pass my money
over to the publishers."5 6 Today, the six-volume set costs $450.00.
The publishers claim that the new set will receive regular supplementation, as promised with the first edition. Unfortunately, the
only supplementation of note to the first edition was a single
hardbound volume. The changes in the law of torts since the first
edition show every likelihood of continuing, thus making supplementation critical. As one reviewer noted, the authors themselves
recognize that the treatise can present "only a single moment in the
constant and inevitable flow of an ever-changing stream of legal liability."'5 7 Perhaps this time the publishers will supplement the work
regularly and often, as promised.
The first edition also met with some surprising criticism for its
addition of a third volume which contained invaluable bibliographic
53. 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
54. Consider, as one of countless examples, Gray's excellent primary and secondary research into the key materials reflecting the change in the law of defamation in the past 20
years. Second Edition, supra note 2, § 5.20 n.1.
55. Keeton, supra note 18, at 230.
56. Malone, supra note 3, at 879-80.
57. Id. at 877.
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data."8 The second edition does the same. This decision will prove
wise beyond any doubt, for the value of bibliographies as sources for
further research and reading more than compensates for any additional cost that the volume will add to the treatise set.
No attorney dealing with torts should fail to purchase this treatise. No law library should omit it from its collection. The first
edition stood out for its leadership and provocative theoretical development; the profession will remember Professor Gray's addition
for its structuring and clarifying. His contribution is more immediate, and at the same time equally important. Like the first edition,
this is truly an important work.

58. Keeton, supra note 18, at 230; Gordon, supra note 17, at 145-46.

